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[NTI~ODUCTI[ON
There has been a dramatic change in the composition of the American
boardroom over the past two decades. Although it remains white,
Protestant, wealthy and Republican, it has taken on a distinctly new
characteristic. Today, most board members of American public
corporations are not financially dependent upon the company on whose
board they serve. But, this was not always the case. One 1970 study
found that ’outside’ directors held 43.5% of the seats on 495 surveyed
corporations’ boards.~ Most recently, outsiders now account for 72% of
directors on public corporations.2 The change reflects the vision that the
function of the board of directors is to monitor the managers’ stewardship
of the firm.3 This belief is in stark contrast with the older view that
directors were ’super’ managers chosen for their capacity to develop
grand policy designs and to supervise their execution by the full-time
managers. The inherent constraints on the outside director’s time as well
as the information reaching him assured that he could never function as
a ’super’ manager.4 At the same time, there has been the recognition that
a critical mass of outside directors could provide much needed discipline
for the otherwise unsupervised managers. Scandals in the early 1970’s
growing out of the efforts of the Watergate Special Prosecutor (who
unearthed extensive bribery of domestic and foreign government officials
by American corporations) heightened the concern for boards of directors
to serve as a watchdog.
1 Smith, ’Interlocking Directorates Among the "Fortune 500" ’, Antitrust L & Econ
Rev, Summer 1970 at 47 & Table 1.
2 Heidrick & Struggles, The Changing Board 3 (1987).
3 See generally M A Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation 159-168 (1976). The
prescription for a monitoring board is carefully set forth in the on-going corporate
governance project of the American Law Institute. See Principles of the Corporate
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations Part III (TD No 2 1984).
4 The falacies of the older perceived view of director qua manager are revealed in
Eisenberg, ’Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation:
Officers, Directors, and Accountants’ (1975) 63 Cal L Rev 375-403.
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But the. independence so obtained by the quest for outside directors
may not have been more than skin deep. To be sure, the ’outside’
directors who predominate on the boards of America’s publicly traded
corporations are not dependen.t upon that firm for their livelihood. Their
principal income is derived from sources other than their boardroom
fees. But their identity, cultural and psychological, is not much different
from that of the managers they are to oversee.
Ninety-three percent of directors are college educated,5 white males,6
with a median age of 54,7 and they are predominantly Protestant and
Republican.s Indeed, the cultural identity among corporate directors is
a source of wonder well documented in the literature.9 That there is little
to distinguish the typical outside director from the firm’s managers whose
stewardship the outside director monitors is evident from the fact that
over seventy-five percent of corporate directors are themselves captains
of industry or the close advisors to those who are.10 Contributing to the
cohesiveness of directors, inside as well as outside directors, is their
association with one another. They are colleagues in the truest sense of
the expression. Directors join with top management on a regular basis
to share a common burden and obligation to advance the corporation’s
interests. To this task, they not surprisingly bring a unified view of the
corporate interest. Studies repeatedly document that the leading criterion
for selecting a board nominee is his probable identification with and
acceptance of the company’s goals and methods of operation.1~ Indeed,
a director is expected not only to work within the group’s collective
views of the corporate interest, but also to cooperate with other board
members, whether they are also managers or not, in reaching decisions
by group consensus.~2 In the face of psychological and sociological forces
such as these13 one may have serious reservations of how well-equipped
the outside director is to discharge his monitoring function. Outside
directors are also bonded to the firm’s chief executive officer through the
active role he plays in their nomination to the board of directors. All
director nominations and decisions to renominate a sitting director occur
through a process that is dominated by the chief executive officer of the
corporation on whose board the nominee will serve.14 To be sure, all
American directors must stand for election by the firm’s stockholders.
5 See Heidrick & Struggles, Director Data 8 (1982).
6 See Heidrick & Struggles, The Changing Board 3 (1987).
7 See Heidrick & Struggles, Director Data 7 (1982).
8 See Heidrick & Struggles, Director Data 8 (1980).
9 See eg G Domhoff, Who Rules America? (1967); T Dye, Who’s Runing America?
(1976) and F Hunter, Top Leadership Cohesiveness (1974).
10 See Heidrick & Struggles, Director Data (1980).
11 See eg J Bacon & J Brown, Corporate Directorship Practice: Role, Selection and
Legal Status of the Board 30 (1975).
12 See eg M Mace, Directors: Myth or Reality 97-101 (1971).
13 For an expanded analysis of the social and psychological forces that can deflect the
outside director from being an aggressive monitor of management, see Cox and
Munsinger, ’Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundation and Legal Implications
of Corporate Cohesion’ (1985) 48 L and Contemp Prob 83.
14 In a significant percentage of nominating committees, the chief executive officer
chairs the nominating committee. Heidrick & Struggles, The Changing Board 4
(1983). Even when the nominating committee is staffed entirely by outsiders, the
chief executive attends their meetings. Perham, ’The Men Who Pick the Board’,
112 Duns Rev, Dec 1978 at 57. In any case, new nominees are advanced only
when they are believed acceptable to top management. Id, at 57-58.
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That ritual, however, rarely exposes the director to hostility; in practice
nomination foreordains the outside director’s election. Therefore, the
outside director legitimately feels disposed to the firm’s chief executive
officer as natural gratitude for his support in obtaining membership to
the board of directors.
A further force impacting the capacity of the outside director are the
intense demands on their time from their major vocation; the time
devoted to their directorial responsibilities is necessarily constricted. This
is not true of the ’inside’ director, but their function within the boardroom
hardly can be expected to conflict with the agenda and activities developed
by them as members of management. Accordingly, the inside director
has never had a vital role in the on-going American debate on corporate
governance. The emphasis has been on the outside director.
Despite the substantial social, psychological, cultural and practical
forces that pose natural impediments to the outside director being a
consistent detached watchdog of management’s stewardship, important
legal institutions have now evolved from the perception that outside
directors can serve as monitors of the firm’s managers. For example, the
imprimatur of the outside directors overcomes serious conflict of interest
concerns when managers enter into transactions with their corporations.
Outside directors are also relied upon as a useful body to investigate
charges of managerial misbehaviour.
This paper describes the historical fiduciary obligations of the American
outside director and contrasts those obligations with prevailing obligations
in today’s environment of the monitoring director. Special attention is
devoted to the role of outside directors when their firm is the target of
a takeover. In no other context are the demands on the outside director
greater and more strain placed on the monitoring model than in the
context of a corporate takeover. The final section of this paper examines
the relief modern statutory provisions provide to the director and the
monitoring function.
Historica~ Cente×t of Director Obligations
The monitoring obligation of outside directors is not a recent phenomenon.
Consider the early case of Barnes v Andrews,15 where the court held that
Andrews, an outside director, whose tenure was less than 9 months, had
breached his duty to inform himself adequately about the newly created
company’s operations. The corporation had raised a substantial amount
of capital through a public offering, possessed a well-equipped and staffed
factory, and produced sufficient parts for its end product, starter motors;
nevertheless the firm encountered dramatic delays in the assembly of
starter motors and ultimately failed. The court held that Andrews breached
his duty by failing to inform himself adequately about the firm’s
performance and position. There was no evidence that Andrews had
made even the most minimal inquiry during his tenure of the company’s
performance or financial position. The holding in Barnes is sharpened
by the absence of any facts or circumstances known to Andrews imparting
notice to him that the firm was experiencing problems. The duty imposed
by Barnes, therefore, is more demanding than the typical case in which
15 298 f 2d 614 (SDNY 1924).
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the director has failed to respond reasonably to warnings that would
have prompted a reasonable director to action.~6 Moreover, Barnes is
more demanding than those cases punishing directors who are habitually
absent from board meetings.~7
But today’s concern for the monitoring director involve problems far
more subtle than posed in Barnes. The concern today is not why the
firm failed financially during the outside director’s watch; the prevalent
question today is the extent of the outside director’s obligation to militate
the company’s violation of federal and state directives against pollution,
employment discrimination, bribery, and unfair competition. On questions
such as these, the burden of inquiry, if it is to be imposed at all, is far
more encompassing and demanding than Barnes imposed upon Andrews.
The only American decision on this question is Graham v Allis
Chalmers Manufacturing Company.18 A derivative suit was brought
against the directors of Allis Chalmers to recover damages the company
suffered because its employees engaged in massive bid rigging with
competitors in flagrant violation of the American antitrust laws. One
theory of the plaintiffs action was that the directors had acted unreasonably
in failing to establish a system to detect and prevent antitrust violations
by company employees. This theory found support in the fact that
nineteen years earlier Allis Chalmers had entered into two consent decrees
with government regulators settling claims of price fixing. The plaintiff
argued that the consent decrees put the current board members on notice
so that they had a duty ’to ferret out such activity and to take active
steps to insure that it would not be repeated’.~9 The Delaware Supreme
Court dismissed the action, reasoning that Allis Chalmers was a large
multinational company with over 30,000 employees. The court reasoned
that it was not reasonable to consider that the directors would undertake
an active investigation of each division of the firm. The court held the
directors acted reasonably in relying upon the reports and summaries of
operations which they had no reason to believe untrustworthy. More
importantly, the court believed the directors had no duty to establish
and maintain a ’law compliance’ program. The court observed that such
a system of surveillance was required only if the board had ’suspicions’
of wrongdoing.2°
If the board is perceived as a body of super managers, rather than
monitors of those who manage, the reasoning in Graham is more
understandable. As a manager and policymaker, delegation is not only
desirable, but essential. Any other approach is not practicable in light of
the limits on the outside directors’ time, information, and acuity to the
problems at hand. But with the current recognised role of outside directors
as a monitor of the managers’ stewardship of the firm, Graham causes
16 In the leading case, Bates v Dresser 251 US 524 (1920), Justice Holmes held that
a teller’s flashy lifestyle should have prompted the bank’s president to inquire
whether shrinkages in the bank’s deposits were the result of the teller’s embezzlements,
which they were. However, the bank’s directors, not being similarly on notice were
held not to have breached their fiduciary duties.
17 See eg Bowerman v Hamner, Receiver, 250 US 504 (1919) (Director had not
attended board meetings for 5 years held to have breached duty to inform himself).
18 41 Del Ch 78, 18 A2d 125 (Sup Ct 1963).
19 Id, 129.
20 Id, 130.
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concern whether it continues to be good authority in today’s world.
Graham’s reasoning is inconsistent with the more recent decision in
Francis v United Jersey Bank,2~ where the court was unwilling to allow
a director to hide behind a veil of ignorance--the very defense upheld
in Graham:
Directors are under a continuing obligation to keep informed about the activities
of the corporation .... Directors may not shut their eyes to corporate
misconduct and then claim that because they did not see the misconduct, they
did not have a duty to look. The sentinel asleep at his post contributes nothing
to the enterprise he is charged to protect .... Directorial management does
not require a detailed inspection of day-to-day activities, but rather a general
monitoring of corporate affairs and policies.22
The difference between Graham and Francis is their placement in time.
Francis was decided two decades after Graham during which time the
received model of the outside director had evolved from that of being
an active manager to that of an active monitor. Moreover, there has
developed since Graham a solid perception that the public corporation’s
board of directors should design and implement legal compliance systems
such as those argued for by the plaintiff in Graham.23 Because the content
of the law is informed by prevailing practices, there is good reason to
believe that the Allis Chalmers board would today be pressed to justify
the absence of any compliance procedures,24 especially in view that the
prevailing legal climate emphasises the monitoring function of outside
directors.25
Any doubt about the role the Delaware Supreme Court has cast the
outside director in is removed by its landmark decision in Smith v Van
Gorkum,26 where the court held the outside directors breached their duty
of care in approving the sale of Trans Union Corporation to Mr Jay
Pritzker for $55 per share. Trans Union was a publicly traded firm
engaged primarily in leasing rail cars. In the course of its operations,
21 87 NJ 15, 432 A2d 814 (1981).
22 87 NJ at 31-32, 432 A2d at 814.
23 See eg American Bar Asociation, Section on Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, Committee on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director’s Guidebook, (1978) 33
Bus Law 1591, 1610 and Statement of Position Concerning the Role of Corporate
Directors of the Business Roundtable (1978) 33 Bus Law 2083 at 2101.
24 Two leading Delaware practitioners have persuasively reasoned that Graham would
be decided differently today because of the changed perspective of the role of
outside directors. See Veasey & Manning, ’Codified Standard--Safeharbor or
Unchartered Reef?. An Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with
Delaware Law’ (1980) 35 Bus Law 919, 930 & n 53. But see Ward, ’Fiduciary
Standards Applicable to Officers and Directors and the Business Judgment Rule
under Delaware Law’ (1978) 3 Del J Corp Law 244, 246-47 (reasoning that decision
to install compliance procedures is akin to an economic decision depending primarily
upon the level of notice and risk of harm. This reasoning appears to overlook cases
such as Barnes and Francis that found a breach of the director’s duty even though
the director was not on inquiry notice).
25 This does not mean, however, that the directors in either Graham or Barnes would
today be liable for their subordinate’s misbehaviour. Even reasonably designed and
superintended compliance programs will not detect or deter all misbehaviour. The
directors’ technical breach in failing to install such a system may ultimately bear
no causal relationship with the harm caused by the subordinate’s wrongdoing. Even
though Andrews breached his duty to inform himself, the court ultimately held he
was not liable because there was no evidence that had he inquired he could have
prevented the company’s failure.
26 488 A2d 858 (Del Sup Ct 1985).
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Trans Union generated large amounts of cash and profits, and more
importantly, accumulated millions of dollars in investment tax credits
that it could not itself use to reduce its income tax liability. Trans Union’s
large backlog of investment credits held great value to any firm acquiring
Trans Union as the credits could be used by the acquiring firm to reduce
its tax obligations. While considering how best to employ the accumulated
tax credits, management also studied the possibility of a management
buyout of the firm. Donald Romans, chief financial officer, estimated
that the cash generated by Trans Union’s on-going operation would
justify a management buyout price of $50-$60 per share; Trans Union
shares were then trading for $38 per share.
Armed with this information, Jerome W Van Gorkum, Trans Union’s
chief executive officer, asked Pritzker if he was interested in buying Trans
Union for $55 per share. Pritzker agreed to the price. At a board meeting
called with only one day’s notice, Pritzker’s ’take it or leave it’ offer to
purchase Trans Union at $55 per share was presented by Van Gorkum
to the board. The meeting lasted barely two hours, the presentation was
completely oral, no written drafts of the agreement were circulated, and
Van Gorkum did not disclose that the $55 figure reflected the price Trans
Union’s own cash flow would justify if the purchase were a management
buyout. The board was never told, and it never inquired, what price a
third party (who could use the Trans Union’s accumulated tax credits)
would pay for Trans Union and its underutilised tax credits. The board’s
behaviour through its consideration of the sale can best be described as
an uncritical acceptance of senior management’s recommendations.
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the directors failed to inform
themselves adequately on the decision before them and, therefore, acted
with gross negligence in approving Trans Union’s sale. The court chastised
the directors for failing to inquire as to the basis upon which the sale
price was determined or, for that matter, informing themselves as to the
intrinsic value of the firm. Certainly monitoring requires on such a
fundamental decision an aggressive probing of management’s reasoning
in support of the proposal submitted to the board. This in fact is what
the Delaware Supreme Court demanded, minimally, of the directors.
Strain and Growth in the Duty to Monitor
The ability of American outside directors to act as an independent
monitor of the firm’s managers undergoes its most severe test in contests
for corporate control. Certainly when there is a hostile bid for the firm,
there are no natural psychological forces that can be expected to drive
the outside directors from their manager’s side. Their prior associations,
shared experiences and aspirations, and continuing nonpecuniary awards
if the firm remains independent, in combination, cause outside directors
to regard the bid as a threat. One need only reflect on how frequently
the board’s response to an outside bid is to assume a siege mentality
and instinctively ’circle wagons’. The initiation of an outside bid repeatedly
results in a ’we-they’ attitude between the incumbent directors and the
unwanted suitor.
As we are aware, the takeover movement that began more than two
decades ago continues to gather momentum. The number and dollar
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amounts involved in hostile takeovers continue to grow. The targets to
takeovers, however, are not without weapons for their own defense.
Indeed, one marvels at the creativity and resourcefulness of skillful
takeover lawyers. It is the implementation of these defenses that puts
the independent director’s monitoring role to its greatest test.
Once again, and not surprisingly, it is Delaware that has weighed into
the fray and it is its decisions that have had the most dramatic impact
on melding the outside director’s performance to the prevailing perception
that they are the monitors of managers. Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum
Co,~-7 held that the board of directors has the burden of proving it acted
in good faith and only after reasonable investigation when it initiated a
defensive manoeuvre. Importantly, Unocal also imposes the demanding
requirement that the defensive manoeuvre ’must be reasonable in relation
to the threat the outside bidder or its bid posed’.28
In both its locus of the burden of proof upon the directors to establish
their good faith and the reasonableness of their investigation, as well as
the requirement that the defensive manoeuvre not be disproportional,
the Delaware Supreme Court has changed dramatically the areas of
inquiry in takeover contests. No longer is it permissible for the target
board to ’wage war at any price’ once they have isolated a difference in
business policy or practices between the incumbent board and the suitor
for control.29 And no longer do the directors enter the legal fray with a
heady presumption of infallibility--they have the burden of persuasion
under Unocal.
This long step in evolving doctrine is based on the courts’ awareness
that contests for control pose an inherent conflict of interest to the
managers and outside directors. So conflicted, the directors should not
enjoy the presumption of propriety and deference that attends their other
decisions. Interestingly, the court, instead of rendering the board totally
incapable, has chosen the middle position of altering the burden in
justifying their actions. Not surprisingly, great emphasis is placed in these
inquiries upon the role and actions of the outside directors. In effect, the
American courts have determined that the outside directors can and
should play an important role in refereeing contests for control.
In Hanson Trust PLC v SCM Acquisition Inc3° the court reasoned that
the outside directors have a special function to serve when asked by self-
interested management to adopt a defensive manoeuvre. The court
envisions that the outside directors must take some steps to independently
assure that the proposed transaction is fair. In the process, the court
suggests they distance themselves from management. Such steps can
include securing their own advisors and constituting themselves as an
27 493 A2d 946 (Del 1985).
28 Id, at 955. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals expressed a more rigorous standard
of requiring an independent non-takeover driven basis to justify defensive maneuvers
in which the target corporation transferred shares to its wholly owned subsidiary
and a smaller block of shares to a newly created employee stock ownership plan.
See Norlin Corp v Rooney Pace, Inc, 744 F2d 255 (2d Cir 1984).
29 Contrast Cheff v Mathes 199 A2d 548 (Del 1964) where sweeping defensive
maneuvers allowed where after a very skanty investigation board learned that bidder
would change target’s marketing practices, had liquidated a few companies he
controlled, and may not have been successful in managing companies he acquired.
30 781 F2d 264 (2d Cir 1986).
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independent negotiating committee to deal with their managers. At a
minimum, Hanson Trust requires outside directors to disabuse themselves
of thinking their’s and the stockholders’ interests are identical to those
of the managers. In sum, monitoring requires the outside directors to
assume an adversarial role vis-a-vis the firm’s managers.3~
Delaware has added an important second dimension to the monitoring
role of outside directors in contests for control. As seen, the Unocal
standard regulates the propriety of defensive manoeuvres. Revlon Inc v
MacAndrews & Forbes Holding,32 holds that at some point outside
directors must cast aside their defensive aspirations and assume an
entirely new role, that of a proactive auctioneer of the firm to the highest
bidder.
In June 1985, Pantry Pride began its attempt to acquire Revlon with
a casual proposal to Revlon’s board of a price in the $40-$50 range per
share. Rebuffed by Revlon’s board, Pantry Pride initiated a hostile tender
offer, initially bidding $47.50, per share, then increasing its bid to $50,
and on October 7th raising it again to $56.25. In early October, Revlon’s
board received offers from two potential white knights. The board
ultimately accepted the bid by Forstmann, Little & Co (Forstmann)
involving a buyout that would permit some management participation.
Pantry Pride was undeterred by the preferential treatment Revlon’s board
continued to extend to Forstman and continued to raise its bid so that
it would narrowly exceed the Forstmann offer. On October 12th, Forstmann
made a new offer of $57.25 per share conditioned upon, among other
matters, the Revlon board granting Forstmann the option to purchase
its Vision Care and National Health Laboratories divisions for $525
million, a price approximately $100-$175 million below their appraised
value. Rather than focusing upon the process by which Revlon’s board
determined the price at which to option these two divisions, the court
challenged the board’s ability at this stage of the contest to engage in
any defensive manoeuvre whatever:
When Pantry Pride increased its offer to $50 per share, and then to $53, it
became apparent to all that the break-up of the company was inevitable ....
The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as
a corporate entity to the maximisation of the company’s value at a sale for
the stockholders’ benefit. This significantly altered the board’s responsibilities
under the Unocal standards .... The directors’ role changed from defenders
of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for
the stockholders at a sale of the company.33
The court enjoined the lock-up options because they destroyed further
bids for Revlon and the options did not result in a higher price for
Revlon. The Delaware Supreme Court has since emphasised that the
31 A lock-up was upheld in Cottle v Storer Communication Inc, 849 F2d 570 (1 lth
Cir 1988), after the court satisfied itself that the directors had negotiated in good
faith with the suitors and granted the option of the assets after satisfying themselves
that the option price was a fair one and that they had received the best offer.
32 506 A2d 173 (Del 1986).
33 506 A2d at 182.
225
8
Bond Law Review, Vol. 1 [1989], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol1/iss2/5
(1989) 1 Bond L R
directors’ role as auctioneers only arises when it appears that the firm
will no longer be independent because its ’sale’ is inevitable.34
Any doubt regarding the Delaware Supreme Court’s devotion to its
newly established ’outside director as auctioneer’ paradigm is removed
by its recent decision in Mills Acquisition Co v Macmillan, Inc?5 Mills
held that the outside directors had breached their fiduciary duty by
favouring in their negotiations the bidder preferred by management over
Macmillan and also failing to establish enough independence from
management so as to evaluate each bid and to determine whether further
negotiations would yield a higher bid. To be sure, the outside directors
are not compelled to accept the bid that merely offers the highest price.
Rather their duty under Revlon is to obtain the best available transaction
for the shareholders. Hence, directors may reject an offer for 42% of the
shares at $70 cash per share with the balance of the shares to be acquired
for preferred stock to be valued at $70 per share, in favour of a $66
cash bid for all the shares?6 Furthermore, Revlon has been interpreted
as not barfing the outside directors from favouring one suitor over
another in the negotiations and arrangements preceding a bid?7. The
Delaware Chancellor has reasoned that Revlon does not compel the
outside directors to preserve a level playing field; they may act to ’tilt’
the field if they do so for the reasonable and good faith purpose of
securing a better transaction for the stockholders.
Even though outside directors are not natural allies to the notion that
the bids of outsiders should be dispassionately regarded or that they
should eschew the advice of managers when the firm is under siege, the
courts have announced standards that casts outside directors in this role.
To be sure, takeover defenses and management buy-outs have struck
many as getting out of hand so that one certainly could have expected
some change in judicial attitudes in response to these phenomena. What
is significant is not that the response has come, but that the courts have
chosen the outside directors to shoulder the all important burden of
protecting the stockholders’ interests. And the role so imposed, while
proactive, nevertheless is one that throughout is consistent with their
overall duty to monitor managers. The following section of this paper
examines whether recent legislative initiatives in Delaware and a majority
of the states are inconsistent with the monitoring function of directors.
Charter ILimits on Directer ILiabi~ity
In the summer of 1986, the Delaware legislature amended its General
Corporation Law to allow the charters of Delaware corporations to include
provisions that limit director liability for damages arising from a breach
34 The Delaware Supreme Court has expressed the view that the ’auctioneer’ paradigm
applies when the sale takes the form of an ’active’ action, management buyout or
a restructuring plan. See Mills Acquisition Co v Macmillan lnc 559 A2d 1261 (Del
1989). It does not apply, however, in a parent-subsidiary cash out merger. Bershad
v Curtiss-Wright Corp, 535A2d 840 (Del Supr 1987). Currently before the Delaware
courts in the on-going Paramount-Time-Warner litigation is whether a friendly
merger accompanied by a hostile bid from a third suitor, Paramount, should be
examined under Revlon or Unocal.
35 559 A2d 1261 (Del 1989).
36 See Citron v FairchiM Camera and Instrument Cor Current Fed Sec L Rep (CCH)
93,915 (Del Ch 1988).
37 See In Re J P Stevens & Co, Inc Shareholder Litigation, 542 A2d 770 (Del Ch
1988).
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of their duty of care.38 Since Delaware enacted its statute, there has been
an avalanche of similar statutory provisions in sister states.39 The twin
impetus for such legislative activity are the case decisions subjecting
outside director judgments to closer scrutiny, such as Smith v Van
Gorkum, and the so-called ’liability insurance crisis’. The latter refers to
the unavailability of unlimited amounts of directors and officers insurance.
Numerous carriers have found this type of insurance was an undesirable
product because of the great actuarial problems they pose as well as the
uncertain litigation environment. As a consequence, legislatures were
sympathetic to the plea that without their action public corporations
could no longer retain or attract high quality outside directors. The
legislatures have thus exempted outside directors for any personal liability
for lapses in their duty of care; managers who also serve on their
company’s board retain their individual liability for breaches committed
in a capacity other than that as a director. It is therefore possible to view
such legislative provisions as restoring the outside director to the position
he enjoyed when low cost, high coverage insurance was bountiful: the
outside director in that environment was not personally at risk, except
for a nominal deductible amount, for any losses from his gross negligence.
There is one impo_rtant difference, however. Most such charter provisions
completely immunise the outside director from any liability, whereas
under the insurance policy the director had some exposure, usually up
to $25,000 or $50,000, the policy’s deductible amount. Because the effect
of such charter provisions is to shield the director from the modest
penalties he previously was exposed to under policies that subjected him
to liability within the deductible limits, many have seen this as a major
retreat from director responsibilities and the evolving role for the
monitoring director.4o The following sets forth this author’s belief that
such charter provisions can be expected to heighten, rather than diminish,
the monitoring role of the outside director.
It is likely that charter limits on director liability will not reduce the
frequency of challenges to director decisions or the standards for their
scrutiny. To be sure, charter provisions will reduce, if not eliminate, the
incidence of outside directors being held personally liable for their
misguided judgments. However, in the face of such a charter provision,
the litigant’s focus will be upon the transaction itself. For example, if
Trans Union had such a charter provision, the plaintiff in that suit could
have been equally successful to seek an order asking the court to submit
the transaction to the board of directors and stockholders for reapproval.
There is every reason to believe that rather than risk the uncertainty of
this process, which may have attracted a second suitor, Mr Pritzker
would have settled the action, much along the lines of his actual settlement
of the case, by increasing the price he was willing to pay. And, of course,
the insurance company’s exposure continues because of the prominent
role played by inside directors, such as Van Gorkum, who are not
38 Del Code Ann 102(b) (7) (Michie 1986).
39 For a description of the various legislative patterns and some of their interpretative
problems, see DeMott, ’Limiting Directors’ Liability’ (1988) 66 Wash ULQ 295-
317.
40 Interestingly, the state of Virginia ’caps’ the amount a director can be liable to the
greater of $100,000 or the director’s cash compensation during the preceding 12
months. Va Code Ann 13.1-692.1(a) (Supp 1987).
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shielded by the charter provision for lapses committed in a nondirectorial
capacity. Because the effect of a charter provision is to focus attention
upon the transaction itself, rather than the personal liability of outsiders,
courts can proceed with their scrutiny of the transaction without fearing
their remedy will be draconian to the individual director. Indeed, those
who have championed the heightened role of courts in protecting
stockholder interests have suggested that limits on director liability are
necessary. In an environment without limits, courts can find a breach
only by imposing what oftentimes is a disproportionate sanction upon
the director. Thus, courts may become even more demanding in the
standards brought to bear on transactions requiring the directors’ approval.
If this occurs, it will be a phenomenon not unobserved by the plaintiff’s
bar who can be expected to become more active as standards for director
conduct arise. The irony of charter provisions such as adopted in
Delaware, therefore, is that it may actually stimulate an increase in the
amount of litigation questioning director judgments.
Eliminating damage recoveries does not erode the incentive for care-
based suits. The contingency suit, peculiar to America, is the major
medium for enforcing officer and director obligations. While at one time
the attorney could recover his fees in a successful suit, only if that suit
produced a monetary recovery, today most fee awards occur because the
suit resulted in a nonpecuniary benefit.4~ Thus a suit that established a
technical breach of the directors’ fiduciary duty and resulted in that
decision’s reconsideration, justifies the award of attorneys fees to the
plaintiff’s lawyer. In sum, the plaintiff’s bar may be a most tangible
beneficiary of charter limits on liability. It remains to be seen, however,
whether such charter provisions will in fact hasten the demands on the
outside director. Certainly, by immunising such directors from liability,
there is no reason to believe that the momentum behind the obligations
of outside directors to monitor will in anyway be slowed because of such
charter provisions.
It is safe to say that the above described evolution of the obligations of
American outside director is unique among common law countries. The
American experience is a rich one, but that is only because it has been
a troubled one shaped by cases raising hard issues in the context of
public concern over the shocking scale of bribery of public officials,
catastrophic damage to the public through violation of environmental,
safety or antitrust laws, or today’s takeover battles. Truly the past 25
years have been a time of growth and refinement in American corporate
law. But it has not frequently been a time to rejoice in the performance
of the American corporation or its outside directors. It is no surprise,
therefore, that this brief period of time has brought a significant change
in the obligations of American outside directors.
The legal demands upon Australia’s outside directors are in the same
tortured state that American case law was prior to the landmark decision
by the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal. Absent inquiry notice,
41 Coffee, ’Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class Action and Derivative
Actions’, (1986) 86 Colum L Rev 669.
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Australian outside directors have no affirmative duties at this point to
initiate surveillance programs to assure their subordinates are complying
with the law. To be sure, the Australian law relies upon the outside
director to serve as a sentry whose duty it is to protect the stockholders
from the darkness of managerial overreaching. But in the most critical
area of self-interest, the defense to a takeover, the mild confusion in the
Australian case law suggests a groping for a better approach. At this time,
the indications are that Australian courts will not choose to involve
themselves as extensively as their American counterparts have in judging
the propriety of defensive manoeuvres.
The touchstone for the duties of directors in the face of a hostile
takeover is Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd,42 a case appealed
from New South Wales. The directors of the target corporation issued a
large block of shares to the party whose bid the board preferred. The
effect was to destroy the majority position of the unwanted suitor, because
the target’s board believed that suitor’s price was too low. Later the
preferred bidder topped the price offered by the unwanted suitor. The
judicial committee, however, did not resolve the case on the same
fiduciary principles that guide American cases in such situations. Indeed,
its argument was a constitutional one based upon the limits of director
discretion embodied in the division of power between directors and
shareholders. It held it was improper for the directors to use their powers
to allot shares ’purely for the purpose of destroying an existing majority,
or creating a new majority .... ’43 The panel reasoned that the departure
from the directors’ fiduciary obligations increased if it appeared that the
ulterior purpose of the share issuance was to enable an offer for shares
to proceed that the existing majority was in a position to block.44 In
sum, the directors’ action in Howard Smith had violated the right of the
existing majority to determine ’the right to dispose of shares at a given
price’.45 In contrast, the Unocal standard would have permitted a totally
discriminatory defensive manoeuvre because the court was satisfied it
was undertaken to secure a better offer. In this respect, Howard Smith
is more rigid than the prevailing American case law; unquestioned
obeisance to Howard Smith in fact can thwart well-meaning efforts of
the target board to secure a higher price for control.
Pine Vale Investment Ltd v McDonnell & East Ltd 46 does not raise
the constitutional concerns that dominated the thinking of Howard Smith,
but focuses upon the motivation of the directors. Pine Vale controlled
26% of McDonnell and East and had announced its bid for a partial
takeover of McDonnell. Before Pine Vale’s formal offer was made,
McDonnell issued rights to acquire additional McDonnell shares to all
of its shareholders to raise funds to acquire another business. The effect
of this was to raise the total cost of Pine Vale partial bid because more
shares were outstanding and McDonnell’s total value would increase due
to the value of the acquired assets. Pine Vale’s application for an
injunction was rejected upon a finding that McDonnell’s directors genuinely
believed their acquisition was in the best interest of the company. To
42 [1974] AC 821 (PC).
43 Ibid, 837.
44 Ibid, 837-38.
45 Ibid.
46 (1983) 9 ACLR 19, 1 ACLC 1294.
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be observed, all McDonnell stockholders were treated and affected equally
under the transaction; Pine Vale’s ownership percentage was not treated
in a discriminatory fashion, as occurred in Howard Smith, because the
offer was equally available to all stockholders. This factor not only
distinguishes Pine Vale from Howard Smith, but also suggests why the
case was decided on the more orthodox fiduciary concerns of purpose
rather than rigid ’constitutional’ concerns. In contrast, Unocal permitted
discriminatory treatment of an unwanted suitor.
The High Court in Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Proprietary Ztd47
resolved whether an allotment of shares to the governing director’s sons
to ensure that control did not pass to his former wife and their daughters
by focusing upon the transaction’s purpose. The majority reasoned that
the propriety of such transactions cannot be decided merely upon proof
that a permissible purpose was the dominant motive of the transaction.
The inquiry should rest upon whether but for the impermissible purpose
the power would not have been exercised.48 This position was later
applied in Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Co. Ltd. 49 The court
emphasised that when the action of directors has a number of substantial
purposes, one of which is impermissible, their action may be set aside
even though the impermissible purpose was not the dominant one,
provided it is established that the impermissible motive is causative in
the sense that but for its presence the directors would never have taken
the action. To the outside observer, the distinction the court attempts
to draw between a dominant motive and one that is causative is purely
semantic. Certainly the motive that leads the board to undertake a
transaction they would not have undertaken ’but for’ the impermissible
motive cannot be seen as other than the one that ultimately dominated
the board’s decision. In Darvall the target of a takeover responded to
the bid by entering into a joint venture agreement to develop an important
asset in conjunction with a cash offer for its shares. Darvall held that
although the board of directors would not have entered into a joint
venture agreement if the firm were not the target of a takeover, their
entering into the agreement would not be enjoined. The court found that
the directors’ purpose was not to defeat the first bid, but to provide the
shareholders with an alternative to that bid. Importantly, Darvall stressed
that the directors’ action may be undertaken for the purpose of
demonstrating to the stockholders that it is not in their best interest to
accept the hostile bid so long as there is a valid commercial interest
underlying the transaction. As such, Darvall appears far more important
not for its resolution of the murky question of causation, but rather what
constitutes an ’impermissible motive’. The quest to secure a better bid
in Darvall can be seen as not an impermissible motive that tainted the
board’s decision. If so viewed, Darvall is inconsistent with Howard Smith
and more dearly in line with Unocal and Revlon approaches.
Absent from the Australian case law is the activism that so characterises
the eagerness of American courts to both weigh the defensive manoeuvre’s
proportionality under the Unocal standard and to enforce the auctioneer’s
role upon the directors under Revlon. Nevertheless the Australian courts
47 [1986-7] 162 CLR 285.
48 Ibid, 294.
49 (1988) 12 ACLR 537.
230
13
Cox: Changing Perceptions into Reality
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1989
appear posed to look beyond a purpose requirement and perhaps are
doing so already. Pine Vale and Darvall are not inconsistent with the
results reached under the American cases for each were undertaken to
secure a higher price for their shareholders. Even Unocal supported a
successful defensive manoeuvre because it provided a higher price for
the stockholders. It remains to be seen whether Howard Smith is a relic
to be ignored by the Australian courts; it can, however, be isolated to
its facts so that it stands for no more than that it is a disproportionate
response to reduce one’s position from being in control to merely a
substantial minority stockholder.
What will bring Australian cases more fully into line with American
cases is a sweeping definition of the role of directors and a discreet
articulation of what circumstances cause that role to change. It may well
be that this will never occur and this may well not be due to the culture
of the Australian courts. An important limitation on the evolution of
directors’ duties in takeovers is the highly textured regulatory regime for
takeovers in Australia. Pills, lock-ups, spin-offs, to mention just a few of
the devices that so frequently appear in American takeover battles, are
not easily implemented within the tight proscriptions of Australia’s
company and securities laws.5° Thus, the shocking defensive manoeuvres
that have stimulated the development of duties for America’s outside
directors may well never present themselves to an Australian court.
Absent such stimuli, American case law may well not have moved away
from the all-consuming importance of the board’s purpose for a transaction
and evolved the prevailing referee and auctioneer roles for the outside
directors.
The revolution within the American boardroom that began over a quarter
of a century ago is still occurring. The decisions in the last few years
have imposed duties upon outside directors that could not be imagined
even ten years ago. This revolution is fed by the perception that outside
directors are neither managers nor shut-eyed sentries. The courts have
shaped duties for the outside directors’ consistent with the received view
that outside directors can serve a monitoring function. Through judicial
intervention in cases such as Smith, Unocal and Revlon the message to
the American boardroom is quite simple: the outside directors must
serve a proactive monitoring function otherwise corporate transactions
are at risk of being judicially disturbed. Throughout it all, the law reflects
its wonderful talent to complement societal perceptions when moulding
rules for current day problems. The role of the monitoring director in
American companies is now well known; whether it will be received in
Australia or other countries will depend not just on that perception, but
other cultural influences, for example the strength of other regulatory
devices such as the specific directives in the companies and securities
codes.
50 See generally DeMott, ’Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation’ (1987)
65 Wash ULQ 69, 114-16 (Finding that 1980 takeover legislation seriously constrains
power of target company to defend itself vis-a-vis the latitude enjoyed by American
and Canadian targets).
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The Australian takeover and control cases reflect the early signs of
development similar to those that occurred in America in the 1970’s.
We are at the early stages of that change and in a legal culture that
reflects none of the broad public rejection of the boardroom orthodoxy
which rejection led to the ’greening’ of the American boardroom. Moreover,
the Australian companies and securities laws do not accord Australian
boards the broad powers their American counterparts enjoy in devising
various defensive and restructuring plans. Australia, therefore, may well
not have the same need to restrain abuses in power through the evolution
of demanding standards for outside directors as has been necessary in
America. The recent decisions in Pine Vale and Darvall nevertheless
reassure us that the Australian courts are not inflexible in their
consideration of the relationship of results to duty. It may well be that
given the right force of circumstances that the Australian courts may be
as instrumental as their American counterparts in shaping the mission
of the outside director.
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